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Essay
Mapping the Labyrinth of
Scientific Evidence
by
DAVID L. FAIGMAN*
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals,' the United States
Supreme Court assumed the task of giving lower courts some direc-
tion in navigating the labyrinthean corridors that connect law and sci-
ence. As the lower courts begin to follow this guide, it is clear that the
Court has only showed them the gateway to the law-science maze,
even though the lower courts are to be its gatekeeper.2 Daubert pro-
vided precious little advice on how to successfully resolve the tangled
relations between law and science.3 However, the little guidance
Daubert does contain provides important clues to a successful
blueprint of the law-science labyrinth.
The single most important "guidepost" contained in Daubert is
the Court's directive to judges to actively evaluate scientific evidence.
This does not mean that the Court envisions judges replacing jurors as
the ultimate determiners of the weight scientific evidence should re-
* , Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would
like to thank my many colleagues who commented on early drafts of this essay. Especially
deserving of my gratitude are Margaret Berger, David Kaye, Roger Park, and Eileen
Scallen.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2. ld. at 2798-99.
3. The lack of advice to be found in Daubert perhaps is best illustrated by the surplus
of commentary seeking to interpret and advance the Daubert lesson; this Essay, of course,
adds to that surplus. For a representative sample, see Bert Black et al., Science and the
Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. Rnv. 715
(1994) (providing a pragmatic account of what separates science from other forms of
knowledge); Paul S. Miller et al., Daubert and the Need for Judicial Scientific Literacy, 77
JunrcArtu 254 (1994) (discussing the need for scientific literacy of trial courts); Linda
Sandstrom Sinnard, Daubert's Gatekeeper: The Role of the District Judge in Admitting
Expert Testimony, 68 TtL. L. REv. 1457 (1994) (suggesting a theoretical approach to deter-
mining reliability to be used when the hypothesis may not be generally accepted); Sympo-
sium, Evidence After the Death of Frye, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 1745 (1994).
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ceive. Instead the Daubert Court understood scientific issues of valid-
ity4 to be integral to determinations of admissibility. Inaccurate
scientific evidence lacks legal relevance. The Court placed the initial
burden of demonstrating validity on the proponent of the evidence
and the initial responsibility for evaluating that validity on the judge.
By replacing the general acceptance standard of Frye v. United States5
with the validity standard of Daubert, the Court discarded a standard
that was deferential to external groups with one that requires judges
themselves to make the necessary determination.
The directive to judges, who are now expected to become sophis-
ticated consumers of science, raises a host of questions and potential
difficulties. Among the two most salient are: first, what is the scope
of this new responsibility? and second, how should this task be imple-
mented as a practical matter? Each of these questions contains nu-
merous subparts, ali ripe with unresolved issues. Is the category of
science so wide that it encompasses such complex fields as high energy
physics and organic chemistry as well as fields such as psychiatry, eco-
nomics, sociology, and medicine? And although it might be a given
that Daubert expects judges to be able to distinguish a mean from a
mode, does the new standard expect such depth that a judge can dis-
tinguish an analysis of variance from a multiple regression analysis or
a Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism from a Polymerase
Chain Reaction? The practical application of Daubert raises signifi-
cant issues concerning the principles that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence generally and the expert testimony rules specifically embrace.
The premise in Daubert is built primarily on the principle of trustwor-
4. Courts regularly use the scientific concepts of reliability and validity interchangea-
bly, terms that have definite scientific meanings. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have
Not. Assessing the Value of Social Science to Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J.
1005, 1010 n.16 (1989) [hereinafter Faigman, To Have and Have Not] (defining reliability
and validity and providing an example illustrating the difference). The Daubert Court
noted this distinction: "[Sicientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the princi-
ple support what it purports to show?) and 'reliability' (does the application of the princi-
ple produce consistent results?)." Daubert, 113 S. Ct at 2795 n.9. The Court stated clearly
that "validity" is the germane inquiry: "In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary
reliability will be based upon scientific validity." Id.
5. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The often-quoted Frye test provides as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014.
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thiness or accuracy. But how do the other principles of the Rules,
such as efficiency, unfair prejudice, and, particularly, necessity interact
with the Daubert premise?
This Essay explores these various questions, and it tries to offer a
perspective by which judges might resolve the complicated and diffi-
cult issues these questions pose. It is organized around the two ques-
tions above, with Section I considering the scope of a judge's
responsibility under Daubert and Section II examining Daubert in
light of the general principles of the Rules of Evidence. My central
operating premise should be stated clearly at the outset: Only when
judges become sophisticated consumers of science will they be able to
effectively integrate the lessons of science into the dictates of the law.
This Essay considers the level of sophistication that is needed and the
composition of the evidentiary framework into which science must be
integrated. This framework encompasses both the rules by which trial
courts scrutinize expert testimony and the rules by which appellate
courts scrutinize trial courts' admissibility decisions.
I. The Scope of a Judge's Responsibility Under Daubert
In his concurring opinion in Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist
voiced a common complaint about the competence of judges to under-
stand complex scientific methods and terminology.6 The majority
opinion, in contrast, expressly affirmed its faith in judges' ability to
master the basic components of science.7 However, as the Chief Jus-
tice pointed out, he does not question judges' intelligence to master
science;8 rather, his concern seems to be their inability to expend the
time and energy that would be necessary to understand the intricacies
of science. The issue then shifts from whether judges can be compe-
tent to how competent they must be. The degree of expertise required
of judges depends largely on the importance of scientific evidence to
the legal system. Unfortunately, little research has been conducted on
the number of cases that depend on scientific expert testimony.9 De-
spite this dearth of research, the popular perception is that science
now plays a very significant role in both the civil and criminal justice
6. 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
7. Id. at 2796.
8. Id. at 2800.
9. On the more general question of how frequently experts are used, see Samuel R.
Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1119.
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systems and this role is likely to increase. 10 If this perception is true,
then significant investment in time and energy to learn scientific prin-
ciples will pay substantial dividends to judges.
A. How Wide Must a Judge's Scientific Knowledge Be?
Some of the reluctance on the part of judges to plunge into the
scientific waters must be that this sea is very wide indeed. Even a
partial list of scientific specialties having legal relevance would cover
several pages of text here. "Scientists" offer opinions on topics rang-
ing from voice spectrography to gas chromatography, from premen-
strual syndrome to post-traumatic stress syndrome, and from
identification through bitemarks to identification through handwrit-
ing. A judge attempting to swim from shore to shore of this sea would
finish, at best, exhausted and, at worst and more likely, drown. To
stay afloat, must judges develop expertise in all areas of science, or is
the expectation and goal more modest?
Daubert does not stand for the lesson that judges should be ex-
perts in any one area, much less in all areas, of science. Instead the
Court created an approach to scientific evidence that only requires
judges to know how to swim, not to actually make the swim across the
entire breadth of science. Judges must, therefore, have the basic skills
necessary to read and understand scientific methods and to integrate
scientific knowledge in their legal decisions. Their skills will be tested
in particular cases, but there will be no general competency test.
This approach to knowledge acquisition is not new or revolution-
ary. In fact, virtually every major law school builds its curriculum
around the principle of general competency. Students do not learn
the details of the sundry topics taught in the modern college of law.
When properly taught, legal education is graduate training that en-
ables students to learn on their own.1' Law school teaches students
the skills, but it is only over a lifetime of practice that those skills are
refined through application to concrete and specific cases.
The problem with judges' familiarity with science is not that they
do not know whether Bendectin is a teratogen or whether silicon
10. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1991). Huber's interpretation of the "crisis" in the law-science relationship has
been severely criticized. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's
Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637, 1726 (1993) (attributing "the prominence of the
book and its author to clever public relations, not merit").
11. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
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breast implants cause connective-tissue diseases, but that they do not
understand basic principles of epidemiology and statistics, principles
which scientists use to study these questions. Reading a scientific re-
port on Bendectin without any training in epidemiology or statistics
would be like reading Palsgraf v. Sidotti without knowing what proxi-
mate cause means. Readers would have a general sense that they
know what is going on and that the argument sounds impressive, but
ask them to explain or criticize it and you are likely to get little more
than a shrugging of shoulders. There has been a good deal of shrug-
ging of shoulders over scientific evidence.
Intertwined with the concern of how wide a judge's knowledge
must be is the problem of identifying where the scientific sea begins
and ends. Practitioners in disciplines ranging from astrology to astro-
physics claim to be "scientists." Just as oceans do not begin and end
abruptly, but instead mix with the fresh waters that flow into them,
science has no bright line boundaries. There are many bodies of
knowledge lying outside the scientific sea or flowing into it that smell
distinctly of brine. Indeed, Rule 702 expressly anticipates this prob-
lem in determining boundaries, including as within the domain of ex-
pert testimony not only "science," but "technical, or other specialized
knowledge."12
The Daubert Court did not discuss the applicability of its holding
to the "technical or other specialized knowledge" contemplated by
Rule 702. In fact, Daubert could be read to apply only to "scientific
knowledge," given the Court's heavy reliance on the definition of the
word science in both its dictionary sense 13 and its more philosophical
sense.' 4 Such a reading displays a crabbed interpretation of the
Court's opinion as well as a misconstruction of the principles underly-
ing Rule 702.15
The purpose of expert testimony under Rule 702 is to "assist the
trier of fact" in doing her job. The trier of fact's task is to weigh facts
put into evidence. The value of an expert's testimony depends on its
factual basis and an expert is not in court to impress upon the jury
12. FED. R EvID. 702.
13. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (citing WEBSTER'S TkIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1252 (1986) for the definition of "knowledge").
14. Id. at 2796-97 (citing Professor Karl Popper's principle of "falsifiability" as the
hallmark of scientific statements, in CONJECTuRES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
ScmrErNc KNOWLEDoE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
15. See David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert Is
It "Scientific," "Technical" or "Other" Knowledge?, PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND
LAw (forthcoming 1995).
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some normative position favored by the expert's employer. 16 Rule
702 is designed to regulate the scope of expert testimony, and it fully
contemplates that sometimes nonscientific disciplines will have access
to facts that might assist jurors.
Although the scientific method continues to attract its share of
detractors and skeptics, the significant advances in science and tech-
nology in the twentieth century illustrate the power of that method.
In identifying, predicting, and controlling the world around us, science
is by far the most powerful intellectual technique known. In fact, the
scientific method is so powerful that disciplines not ideally suited for
its use have from time to time sought its mantle, including history,
philosophy, and the law. However, the recognition of the power of
science should not be interpreted as blind allegiance to its dictates.
Science provides no assistance over broad and profoundly important
areas of human concern, most particularly that of values. Moreover,
science is slow, even plodding, and it often requires ideal conditions
that rarely exist or studies only small numbers of variables that limit
the ability to generalize any findings. The questions scientists ask and
the methods they choose to study them are invariably infused with the
researchers' implicit beliefs, both normative and empirical.17
These limitations on science are implicit in Rule 702's recognition
that "technical or other specialized knowledge" should sometimes be
permitted to form the foundation for expert opinion. But given the
power of the scientific method, these alternatives should suffice only
where science provides too little assistance or so much assistance that
it amounts to overkill. In general, two problems recur that limit sci-
ence's usefulness to the law. The first involves factual questions that
do not lend themselves to the scientific method because they are
either inherently not amenable to it or they are so complex that scien-
tists do not yet have the tools to study them; the second concerns mat-
ters so elementary that nonscientists' extensive experience with them
should be sufficient for the law's purposes.
The scientific method assumes the replicability of physical phe-
nomena.' 8 But not all facts repeat themselves. The classic example of
facts that are intensively studied but are not replicable are historical
events. Despite Santayana's caution that "[t]hose who do not remem-
16. See generally Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 4, at 1074-79.
17. Faigman, To Have and Have Not, supra note 4, at 1026-39.
18. See generally ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRucruIE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE
LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 29-46 (1979).
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ber the past are doomed to relive it,"19 understanding the present or
predicting the future from historical "facts" is a perilous business.20
Frequently, history is highly relevant to legal decision making and the
law must depend on a nonscientific method for gathering that infor-
mation.21 This is not to say that the law should not demand the best
methods that historians have in their arsenal-many of which are
highly sophisticated techniques that rival science for eliminating alter-
native hypotheses22-only that those methods are not "scientific." But
the lesson is clear: Judges cannot insist on their preconceived notions
of appropriate methods, but instead must become acquainted well
enough with the methods of the fields they rely on to recognize find-
ings worthy of the law's attention.
Some facts of relevance to the law involve matters so complex
that scientists have not, and perhaps can never, isolate the phenome-
non sufficiently to study it in depth. Indeed, many of the factual ques-
tions the law raises about human behavior are examples of complex
phenomena not easily studied. For example, the psychological effects
of extreme stress present formidable difficulties for psychologists. To
recognize that many reputedly scientific matters remain on the perim-
eter of scientific skill should not lead to scientific nihilism.23 Just as
with the study of history, noted above, the proper response to empiri-
cal complexity should not be to call in the witchdoctor for a magic
spell, but rather to demand the best science available and remain
aware of its limitations. For instance, although meteorologists are not
absolutely accurate in predicting as complex a phenomenon as the
19. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LimE OF REASON (1953).
20. Henry Adams nicely captured this lesson: "The historian must not try to know
what is truth, if he values his honesty; for, if he cares for his truths, he is certain to falsify
his facts." THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 279 (Rhoda Thomas Tripp
ed., 1987) (citing HENRY ADAMs, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 37 (1907)).
21. A classic instance of history's relevance, although not specifically involving an
"adjudicative fact," occurred in the desegregation litigation of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. An intermediate court asked the two sides for further argument on the intention of
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding public school segregation. Brown v.
Board of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (miscellaneous orders). Volumes of historical scholar-
ship were offered by the litigants. However, the historians could not reach consensus on
the matter. The Court later dismissed these materials, stating, "At best, they are inconclu-
sive." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
22. Cf. William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REv. 1237, 1245, 1250-56 (1986) (explaining and encouraging the use of methods of
neutral principles and interpretivism as effective means of resolving constitutional issues).
23. The so-called "hard sciences" also raise questions that might never be amenable
to testing. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TnAm: FROM T-m BIG
BAG TO BLACK HOLES 74-75 (1988) (discussing the physical impossibility of building a
particle accelerator large enough to test grand unified theories of the universe directly).
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weather, they far out perform their witchdoctor competitors.24 The
law must be sophisticated enough to appreciate the differences in the
methodological tools used by meteorologists and those wielded by the
authors of the Farmers Almanac.
At the other extreme, the law also depends on facts that are read-
ily known through extensive study or experience, but with which triers
of fact are likely to have little familiarity. A common example of spe-
cialized knowledge contemplated by Rule 702 is that held by mechan-
ics. The law permits auto mechanics to testify because their
knowledge is thought to be readily obtainable so long as they spent
enough time studying the matter.25 But recognizing that some facts
can be known without the elaborate methods of science does not re-
fute the relevance of the scientific method; it only indicates that some-
times that level of expertise is not necessary. The workings of a
carburetor are no less susceptible to scientific understanding than the
workings of a supercollider, the law merely assumes that an exper-
ienced mechanic can accurately describe the former, but only a scien-
tist can accurately describe the latter. This aspect of Rule 702 is
essentially an efficiency principle related to the necessity principle dis-
cussed in the next Section. In short, Rule 702 implicitly relaxes the
requirement for a scientific demonstration when a less rigorous, less
time consuming, and less expensive alternative would provide suffi-
ciently accurate information. When the subject of expert testimony is
straightforward, the law dispenses with the requirement of scientific
proof because it is excessive, not because it is unavailable.
B. How Deep Must a Judge's Scientific Knowledge Be?
Although there are numerous applications of science in the law,
the categories of expertise are fairly limited. Whereas psychology
seems pervasive, cosmology appears rarely in published opinions.26
The principal skill that most, if not all, legal uses of science share is
knowledge of descriptive and inferential statistics. In fact, in light of
the numerous occasions in which statistics are relied upon in everyday
24. See generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SciENcE 7 (1987) ("Pre-
dictability is one thing in a cloud chamber where two particles collide at the end of a race
around an accelerator. It is something else altogether in the simplest tub of roiling fluid, or
in the earth's weather, or in the human brain.").
25. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §13, at 21-22 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) (stating the expert's contribution is the power to draw inferences from the
facts that a jury would not be competent to draw).
26. A recent Westlaw search uncovered eight cases in the United States in which the
word "cosmology" appeared, none of which involved application of that science.
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legal practice, it is a little surprising that law schools do not require an
introductory course in the subject. In addition to statistics, most legal
uses of science depend on fairly straightforward research methodolo-
gies, including animal studies, case studies, epidemiological studies,
quasi-experimental designs, and controlled experiments. With one
course in statistics and one in research methodology, the average
judge would have little difficulty reading reports of research in such
diverse areas as trademark infringement surveys, predictions of dan-
gerousness, repressed memories, and electromagnetic radiation. With
little additional study, DNA profiling and gas chromatography could
be readily understood.
In responding to the query, how deep must a judge's knowledge
be?, some perspective on the question must be maintained. In a
sense, the best answer is that a judge should obtain as deep and
profound an understanding as is possible under the circumstances.
Judges must learn the methods of science not to resolve scientific de-
bates, but rather to resolve legal debates. 27 In large measure,
Daubert's replacement of Frye anticipates that there will be many
cases in which the research lacks general consensus in its field, but it is
accurate enough to assist the trial process. Of course, if scientists are
unable to agree on the validity of the research, we should hesitate
before asking judges (or juries, for that matter) to settle the matter.
Judges provide a screening function to determine whether the science
is sufficiently valid to assist the trier of fact. Judges thus should ex-
clude bad science in order to control the flow of confusing, misleading,
erroneous, prejudicial, or useless information to the jury. Their job is
to protect the integrity of the trial process.
As judges begin to assume the task of evaluating science substan-
tively, they can be expected to seek training in basic statistics and re-
search methodology. In fact, since Daubert was decided, many
professional education programs for federal and state judges have fo-
cused on scientific topics.2 8 In addition, the market can be expected
to respond, and indeed already has responded, to this need for infor-
27. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798-99 ("We recognize that in practice, a gatekeeping
role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is
struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understand-
ing but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.").
28. For example, the Federal Judicial Center recently has held programs on scientific
evidence in New Orleans (Dec. 12-13, 1994) and San Francisco (Jan. 23-24, 1995).
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mation.29 Therefore, with a willingness to learn and a sense of adven-
ture, judges can introduce themselves to a world of intellectual rigor
and aesthetic symmetry and avoid a world of unbounded speculation
and logical anarchy. However, judges will soon find that the difficult
part lies not in learning what science has to offer, but in integrating
those offerings into a legal framework that is not altogether suited for
the task. The perplexing question of how to integrate science into the
law is the topic of the next Section.
III Implementing Daubert
The Daubert opinion is, with regard to evidentiary foundations,
incomplete. It is one-dimensional in that it relies on only one princi-
ple, validity, to set forth the standard for admitting scientific evidence.
In evidentiary terms, scientific validity relates to the trustworthiness
or accuracy component inherent in the Federal Rules' structure. Si-
multaneously, the opinion explicitly mandates that judges use Rule
403 to exclude scientific evidence that, while valid and relevant, none-
theless would substantially and unfairly prejudice the opponent or
waste the court's time.30 Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the second ma-
jor foundational principle that joins trustworthiness to define many
provisions of the Federal Rules is missing from the Court's interpreta-
tion of Rule 702. In many other evidentiary contexts, necessity plays a
significant role in determining the admissibility of evidence. It is all
the more surprising that necessity plays no part in Rule 702 because
the intersection of science and law would seem especially well suited
to this principle.
In a wide range of evidentiary contexts, the Rules apply the
formula that the sum of trustworthiness and necessity determines ad-
missibility. The most notable examples, and the ones most pertinent
to the present discussion, are the numerous exceptions to the hearsay
29. Two projects dedicated to this educational need will be published this year. The
Federal Judicial Center is publishing a manual that will provide federal judges with an
overview of methodologies in such areas as epidemiology, toxicology, multiple regression
analysis, and others. And in a project that will complement the FJC report, West Publish-
ing Company is publishing a comprehensive two-volume manual that will provide in-depth
analysis of more than 40 different areas of science, with the principal chapters written by
renowned scientists, covering such diverse areas as survey research, repressed memories,
battered woman syndrome, DNA profiling, breast implants, soil analysis, and so on.
WEST'S COMPANION TO ScIErrIc EVIDENCE (David L. Faigman et al. eds., forthcoming
1995).
30. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
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rule.3 1 For example, Rule 803 does not require that the declarant be
unavailable because the exceptions it contains are deemed sufficiently
trustworthy without a showing of special need; Rule 804, in contrast,
requires a showing that the declarant is unavailable because the state-
ments permitted under that rule are considered less trustworthy than
those of Rule 803. Therefore, as the need for the evidence increases,
the demand for trustworthiness decreases, and vice versa.32
On its face, Rule 702 does not express the kind of necessity prin-
ciple discussed in this Section. Perhaps a more liberal and enlightened
reading of the Federal Rules than is currently in fashion could find the
principle implicit in the Rules' text. I take no position here on the
proper school of interpretation to follow when reading the Federal
Rules and leave that difficult task to others who have assumed it.33
This Section argues that Rule 702 would allow judges to better inte-
grate science into the trial process if it contained a necessity principle.
31. The most obvious other example is the Best Evidence Rule and, specifically, Rule
1004, which permits nonoriginal documents if certain conditions associated with special
need are met. In fact, Rule 403, the bedrock upon which the Rules are built, contains a
negative necessity principle by providing for exclusion of relevant evidence that wastes
time or needlessly presents cumulative evidence. One more example is Rule 611(c):
"Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as
may be necessary to develop the witness's testimony."
32. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 804 is explicit about this calculation:
Rule 803 ... is based upon the assumption that a hearsay statement falling within
one of its exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion that whether
the declarant is available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in determining
admissibility. The instant rule proceeds on a different theory: hearsay which ad-
mittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the stand may
nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets
a specified standard. The rule expresses preferences: testimony given on the
stand in person is preferred over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality,
is preferred over complete loss of the declarant.
For more extensive and critical analyses of the trustworthiness/necessity relationship in the
hearsay rules, see Michael L. Siegel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal For A Best Evi-
dence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REv. 893, 946-48 (1992) (arguing that, in reality, unneces-
sary and potentially unreliable hearsay statements are routinely admitted); Eleanor Swift,
A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. Rnv. 1339, 1371 n.96 (1987) (sug-
gesting that the necessity "principle" may only serve expediency and fails to reflect true
necessity).
33. See, ag., Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the
Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx. L. lFnv. 745 (1990) (warning that application of the
plain meaning standard will have a negative impact on evidence law and will fail to satisfy
policy goals); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning and the Law of
Evidence AM. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995) (arguing that the best approach to construc-
tion of the Evidence Rules is practical reasoning); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme
Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OrIo ST. LJ. 1307 (1992)
(arguing that application of the doctrine of legislative intent is misplaced in interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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Therefore, if the Rules are thought not to contain such a principle,
then they should be amended to include it; and if the Rules can be
construed to contain that principle, then judges need to begin devel-
oping that principle in the light of Daubert.
A. Incorporating the Necessity Principle in Practice
Perhaps the basic problem endemic in the integration of law and
science is that the law's search for truth is time-bound, whereas sci-
ence strives for truths unencumbered by limitations periods and
crowded dockets. For instance, a plaintiff who brought suit in 1960
claiming that exposure to asbestos caused her illness might have lost
because the research studies demonstrating the health hazards of as-
bestos were not yet adequately known; the plaintiff who sued after the
research was reported is thus able to prevail not because her situation
is different from her predecessor's, but only because her timing was
better.34 The law works under extraordinary time pressure and is lim-
ited by the ignorance of the age. The law desires truth, but realisti-
cally settles for justice and fairness. Fairness in particular mandates
that the evidentiary rules for scientific evidence include a necessity
component.
The necessity principle speaks to a host of limitations inherent in
the law's need for science "now," as well as the limitations in science's
ability to answer the complex questions the law tends to ask of it. A
principal difference between law and science is that the law must
make decisions today, even if that means resolving a problem with
imperfect or with no information. Science usually can defer judgment
until sufficient data have been collected. The timelessness of science
undermines the timeliness of the law. When judges look to science
and find an incomplete picture, they should decide admissibility on
the basis of a combination of scientific merit and jurisprudential need.
Adding a necessity principle to expert testimony rules would per-
mit judges to make more flexible and subtler judgments regarding the
34. The necessity principle developed in this Essay is closely related to the obstacle
created by statutes of limitation. If limitation periods were relaxed pending the completion
of significant empirical research, necessity would not be an important factor in the eviden-
tiary context. See generally Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in
Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965, 970 (1988) (arguing for the abolishment
of statutes of limitations in toxic substance litigation to improve the quality of evidence and
"delaying litigation until scientific understanding of causation can be more fully devel-
oped"); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659,
668 (1989) (discussing asbestos defendants state-of-the-art defense based on the inability to
warn product users of hazards of which defendants were unaware at the time).
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state of scientific research. For instance, it would permit a judge to
say that though the research so far conducted is not as sound or as
extensive as we might desire or expect in the future, it is admissible
because of special need. At the start of most ultimately successful
research programs there are studies that are "promising" or that indi-
cate that further research is likely to demonstrate substantial findings.
If the law waits for this subsequent work to be conducted, some par-
ties will be disadvantaged by not having the evidence available to
them. At the same time, the necessity principle will allow judges to
exclude scientific evidence when those early findings failed to fulfill
their promise or were never pursued with any rigor.
To be sure, admitting evidence that has not yet matured poses
many dangers. A principal danger is that subsequent research will fail
to confirm the promise of the early work. But there is no functional
difference between making a mistake to admit evidence and making a
mistake to exclude evidence. Only the identity of the injured party
changes. The costs associated with making these errors depend on the
circumstances of the particular context. This is a subtle judgment that
presents a substantial challenge if faithfully carried out. It means that
judges would do an explicit evaluation of the costs associated with
making a mistake in the legal context in which the science is offered.
For instance, early in the Bendectin litigation, plaintiffs pursued
causes of action against Merrell Dow on the basis of only a few studies
examining the teratogenic effect of the drug.35 At that time, the "real-
ity" of Bendectin was uncertain. Merrell Dow's position was that to
permit these suits to go forward would force it to remove a beneficial
drug from the marketplace and, possibly, deter it and other companies
from high-risk (and high-benefit) drug production.3 6 Plaintiffs argued
that to not permit them the opportunity to introduce the limited em-
pirical evidence available would forever foreclose them from recover-
ing for their injuries. Courts were thus presented with a choice
between two types of error. They could have excluded the expert tes-
timony when, in fact, the drug caused birth defects, or they could have
admitted the expert testimony when, in fact, the drug did not cause
birth defects. In determining the "admissibility" of the research, the
35. For a thorough examination of the evolution of a toxic tort litigation, see Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 301, 318, 350-58 (1992).
36. In fact, Merrell Dow "voluntarily withdrew Bendectin from the market in 1983"
because of "the increasing number of lawsuits and the decline in sales caused by negative
publicity." I at 319.
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judge must "balance" the costs of making one or another error under
conditions of uncertainty.37
Although in one sense science is "timeless," as a practical matter
scientists regularly must decide whether to accept or reject particular
theories or hypotheses. In making this judgment, two types of error
are possible. A researcher might conclude that the factor of interest
had an effect when it did not (type I error); or she might conclude that
the factor of interest had no effect when it did (type II error). Scien-
tists have adopted certain conventions to minimize an experimenter's
independent judgment in drawing conclusions from data. In particu-
lar, the much discussed convention of a .05 probability of confidence
restricts researchers to the relatively conservative risk of a five per-
cent chance of making type I errors (assuming that the null hypothe-
ses is true).38 But this is only a standard and the costs associated with
either type of error in particular cases might lead scientists to change
it. Sometimes, researchers might wish to lessen the risk of making a
type I error by adopting a more conservative level of confidence, say
one out of one hundred (.01); less concern with making a type I error
may lead a researcher to adopt a less conservative level of confidence,
possibly ten out of one hundred (.10).39
In deciding whether to admit scientific evidence into court, judges
confront the same possibilities of error as scientists. The trial court
makes what might be termed a type I error when it admits scientific
evidence that is invalid; and it makes a type II error when it excludes
evidence that is valid. The fact that the jury ultimately decides how
much weight to attribute to the science does not alter this predica-
ment. First of all, juries should only hear relevant evidence and scien-
tifically invalid findings are irrelevant. There is little reason to
believe, and some to doubt, that juries have the scientific sophistica-
37. The balance of costs associated with admitting certain kinds of scientific evidence
would ultimately be determined by appellate courts and thus would be settled across
jurisdictions.
38. See DAVID BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE
EVIDENCE 237-38 (1983) (comparing two general rules, the Supreme Court's indication of
"two to three standard deviations" and others courts' use of 95% for discrimination cases);
D. HINKLE ET AL., APPLIED STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 159 (1979).
39. One standard statistics textbook suggests that researchers should find an effect
when the p level is greater than .01 (Le., probability of making a type I error is less than
one percent) but not when it is greater than .10. When the p level is in between, the
significance is borderline, and any conclusions should be viewed accordingly. DAVID G.
KLEINBAUM & LAWRENCE L. KUPPER, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER
MULTIVARIABLE METHODS 29 (2d ed. 1988). See generally Faigman, Have and Have Not,
supra note 4, at 1037 n.110 (contrasting research on drugs thought to treat AIDS from
those thought to have cosmetic benefits in regard to what decision rule to apply).
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tion to correct judicial errors. Moreover, even if jurors are more sci-
entifically literate than judges, the predicament of the inevitability of
error is endemic to the scientific enterprise. The principal concern,
regardless of whether the judge or jury decides the matter, is which
type of error is best avoided. Inherent in this determination is the
necessity principle, which is a function of the state of the art of the
science in light of the value considerations present in the pending
matter.
The necessity principle requires judges to take into account the
state of the science in light of the nature of the legal issues involved.
Science can no longer be appraised in simplistic categorical terms as
accurate or inaccurate. Like other matters with which judges are
quite familiar, scientific statements contain error rates that qualify
their value. At the same time, different costs are associated with mak-
ing mistakes in different legal contexts. For instance, judges might de-
mand greater accuracy in psychological assessments of dangerousness
in capital sentencing hearings than in parole hearings. It might be that
psychologists are slightly better than chance in predicting dangerous-
ness, but the irreducible and substantial prospect of false-positive pre-
dictions might compel a judge to exclude this evidence as posing too
great a danger in capital cases.
A sophisticated appreciation of scientific error rates might lead to
what many legal observers would consider paradoxical outcomes.
Specifically, it modifies substantially the principle of stare decisis. For
example, a plaintiff who brings suit before the science has fully ma-
tured might be permitted to introduce the little research available be-
cause of jurisprudential need and because it provides the best
available factual resource. However, in time the research might fail to
fulfill the promise of the early studies, and experts will no longer be
permitted to testify. The necessity principle thus turns current prac-
tice almost on its head. Today, in theory at least, early plaintiffs can-
not introduce immature scientific research no matter how urgent the
need; plaintiffs filing suit later are expected to offer only mature re-
search results.
At first glance, the necessity standard contains the potential for
producing disincentives to conducting the serious research needed to
truly test experimental hypotheses. Much "scientific" expert testi-
mony is more the product of advocacy positions than observation or
experiment. If early hypotheses are permitted, then these expert-ad-
vocates might be disinclined to seriously test their theories. This re-
sult would be the exact opposite of what good science and the Daubert
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Court mandate. Under the necessity principle, scientists would not be
permitted to rest on their early research with the expectation that the
law will continue to permit it to be presented to the trier of fact. A
basic component of the necessity principle is the judge's appreciation
of the nature of the scientific enterprise. Specifically, judges must fac-
tor into their admissibility determinations both the opportunity and
the difficulty of doing the sort of research on which the expert seeks to
report. A basic tenet of the scientific method is that hypotheses will
be rigorously tested, however promising the early findings.
One illustration is the history of research on the battered woman
syndrome. In 1979 Lenore Walker posited the hypothesis that women
who have been victims of long-term abusive relationships suffer from
a condition Walker termed "battered woman syndrome. ' 40 Consis-
tent with this hypothesis, Walker argued, women who suffer from bat-
tered woman syndrome and kill their batterers might be justified in
doing so despite the fact that the circumstances surrounding the kill-
ing appear inconsistent with traditional notions of self-defense. The
two main components of Walker's argument are the cycle theory and
learned helplessness. 41 The syndrome theory was originally based
upon Walker's clinical experience with 120 women;42 at that time,
however, it had not been the subject of an extensive or rigorous re-
search project. Subsequently, in 1984, Walker published a book re-
40. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 31-77 (1979) (describing the common
characteristics of the battered woman, the men who batter, the psychosocial theory of
learned helplessness, and the cycle theory of violence) [hereinafter BATrERED WOMAN].
41. The cycle theory purports to describe three distinct phases of the typical battering
relationship. A "tension building phase" erupts into an "acute battering incident," which
is in turn followed by "loving contrition." Id. at 55-70. According to the cycle theory, the
battered woman is reduced to a state of fear and anxiety during the first two phases of the
cycle, and her perception of danger extends beyond the time of the battering episodes
themselves.
To explain why a woman in a "constant state of fear" does not leave the battering
relationship, battered women defendants invoke Walker's adaptation of Martin Seligman's
"learned helplessness" theory. Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Help-
lessness in the Dog, 73 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256 (1968). Seligman and his colleagues
found that laboratory dogs, after being subjected to repeated shocks over which they had
no control, "learned" that they were helpless. When subsequently introduced to an es-
capable situation, the dogs failed to escape. Seligman generalized this phenomenon to
depression in humans. MARTIN SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOP-
MENT, AND DEATH (1975). Applying this theory to the problem of battered women,
Walker explains that "the women's experiences.., of their attempts to control the violence
would, over time, produce learned helplessness and depression as the 'repeated batterings,
like electrical shocks, diminish the woman's motivation to respond."' LENORE WALKER,
THE BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME 87 (1984) [hereinafter BATTERED WOMAN SYN-
DROME] (quoting BATT7ERED WOMAN, supra note 40, at 49).
42. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 40, at xiii.
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porting the first extensive study of the syndrome, a project funded by
the National Institute of Mental Health and involving more than 400
women.
4 3
Incorporating the necessity principle into Daubert's framework, a
judge should review the research history of battered woman syndrome
with great care and a critical eye. In 1979 the hypothesis was novel
and for that reason alone had little empirical support. Nonetheless,
the theory was supported by clinicians who had experience with bat-
tered women and moreover conformed to a common sense view of
what might be the outcome of violent relationships. Because criminal
defendants were advancing this scientific theory, the prejudicial effect
was not as great as if the prosecution had been the proponent of the
evidence. Although it is a close judgment, a rational judge in 1979
might very well have been inclined to admit the expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome.
By 1984 the scientific context had changed. As judges should ex-
pect, the research offered five years after the theory's inception went
significantly beyond what was initially available. Unfortunately, the
work conducted in those five years was criticized as particularly infer-
ior.44 The necessity principle requires that judges evaluate scientists'
work given their opportunity to test their hypotheses, and a judge seri-
ously reviewing the research in 1984 would have been quite disap-
pointed with the tests done on the original hypothesis. The 1984
research report failed to fulfill the promise of the earlier work primar-
ily by failing to adhere to some of the most basic dictates of the scien-
tific method.4 5
To be sure, not all scientific questions are easily studied and the
necessity principle mandates that judges factor in the difficulty of
studying the hypothesis of interest. In fact, the battered woman syn-
drome is a particularly good example of a social phenomenon that is
difficult to test. For obvious reasons, psychologists cannot use con-
43. BATrED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 41, at 1.
44. For criticisms, see David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and
Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissen4 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986) (questioning the
validity of the research on battered woman syndrome and arguing that expert testimony
should not be admitted) [hereinafter Faigman Note]; see also James R. Acker & Hans
Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testimony: A Comment on State v. Kelly,
21 Crum. L. BuLL. 125 (1985) (arguing matters covered in the testimony are not "beyond
the ken" of the average juror and its admission diverts attention from other logically rele-
vant facts).
45. See Faigman, supra note 44, at 636-43 (discussing a variety of significant flaws in
the research testing the cycle theory and the application of learned helplessness to battered
women who kill).
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trolled experiments to study the effects of violence. But this difficulty
does not mean that it is impossible to study the effects of violence, nor
does it excuse poorly designed research. Judges, no less than scien-
tists, should expect that, given sufficient time and resources, psycholo-
gists will test their hypotheses with the best tools available.
Strictly speaking, the law's "need" for scientific evidence is not
likely to decrease substantially as time passes. The law's need for in-
formation on the effects of domestic violence in the absence of better
research remains. Incorporation of the necessity principle forces
judges to recognize the process of scientific advancement. Scientists'
failure to pursue rigorous testing of a hypothesis should lead to in-
creased doubt about the accuracy of the hypothesis. For example,
early in the debate over cold fusion, scientists and laypersons were
willing to give B. Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann the benefit of
the doubt that they had created fusion at room temperature in Utah
based largely on their impressive qualifications. 46 As time passed and
they continued to delay a public demonstration of their results, doubts
about cold fusion's validity grew. Although at no time would cold
fusion have met the Daubert test because it was never adequately
tested,47 this history contains an important lesson: science embodies a
developmental nature that demands extensive, exhaustive and contin-
uing critical examinations of its tenets. Science thus must evolve; the
law must come to understand this nature and demand that scientists
adhere to it.
The necessity principle requires judges to incorporate the com-
plexity of research and the inherent difficulty of fully testing some sci-
entific theories. In every scientific field, from physics to psychology,
there are hypotheses that defy direct observation or straightforward
tests. However, our inability to "see" an electron, for example, does
not undermine a rigorous examination of its existence, nature, and
form. Difficult and complex theories require more imaginative re-
search designs. One of the basic lessons of Daubert should not be lost:
Daubert exhorts scientists to do good science and expects them to be
scientists first and expert witnesses (and advocates) second.
46. For an excellent history of the cold fusion debacle, see GARY TAUBES, BAD ScI-
ENCE: THE SHORT LIFE AND WEIRD TiMEs OF CoLD FUSION (1993).
47. Although Pons and Fleischmann "tested" the hypothesis, their tests were plainly
inadequate. Moreover, they failed to publish their work in a peer reviewed journal and
there was no general acceptance of their theory. Id. at 53-66.
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B. The Challenge and Peril of the Necessity Principle
As the previous discussion indicates, successful use of the neces-
sity principle depends on judges' adequate understanding of scientific
techniques. However, this understanding cannot be limited to trial
court judges because appellate judges have an integral role to play in
the process as well. In fact, because the necessity principle turns stare
decisis almost on its head, the process requires a dynamic dialogue
between trial and appellate judges. This Section begins by examining
the process by which trial and appellate judges should resolve issues of
scientific evidence. Finally, this Section concludes with a warning con-
cerning the dangers inherent in using a necessity standard without a
sophisticated appreciation of the science involved.
(1) Daubert and Appellate Review: The Challenge of the Necessity
Principle
The Daubert Court did not address the issue of the appropriate
degree of appellate review of a trial court's determination concerning
validity under Rule 104(a). Although appellate courts are typically
deferential to lower court's findings of fact, good reasons exist to
modify that approach in the context of scientific evidence. Unlike vir-
tually all other preliminary factual questions made under Rule 104(a),
a large component of the decision surrounding scientific evidence
transcends individual cases. Whether Bendectin is a teratogen, elec-
tromagnetic fields contribute to childhood leukemia, smoking causes
cancer, procedures for DNA profiling are valid and reliable, and
others are issues that are similarly presented across jurisdictions.4s
Appellate courts conducting an independent substantive review of the
science can contribute substantially to the process of settling these
matters.
In the usual application of Rule 104(a), trial courts must make a
context-specific factual determination. For instance, trial courts must
find, by a preponderance of evidence, that a conspiracy existed before
permitting evidence under the exclusion for statements made by a
coconspirator;49 and the trial court must similarly find that a statement
48. These issues all fall into the category that Professors Monahan and Walker labeled
"social frameworks." See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New
Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. Rv. 559, 563-70 (1987). The authors describe an
emerging use of social science in law in which empirical information is offered to provide a
background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case.
49. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). The trial court must also find,
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), that the statement was made "during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy."
January 1995]
was made under a belief of impending death before permitting evi-
dence under the exception for dying declarations.50 Because these
facts are specific to the case before the judge and do not repeat them-
selves in the same form in other cases, substantial deference to the
judge as fact finder logically flows out of the judge's close proximity to
the matter. When the preliminary facts are not case specific, logic de-
mands little or no deference to the trial court's findings.
Scientific evidence reflects a more complicated structure than the
ordinary preliminary fact.5' At least three levels of science must be
accounted for in the admissibility determination. First is "the theory
or principle that provides authority for the conclusions that are drawn
from the data. ' 52 An example of this abstract theoretical level of sci-
ence is the hypothesis that each person's DNA is unique and uniquely
defines that individual. The second level is "the general technique or
procedure that produces the data." 53 Continuing the DNA example,
this level is represented by the laboratory procedures developed to
extract and study DNA. The final level is the most concrete: "the spe-
cific practices used to obtain the data."' 54 Completing the DNA exam-
ple, this level concerns the laboratory procedures used to "match" the
forensic DNA sample with the known sample in the particular case.
The value of scientific evidence, both in terms of admissibility and
weight, depends on all three levels of scientific investigation.
The inherent structure of science should lead to a process of ap-
pellate review whereby trial court findings of fact at the first two
levels of science, the theory and general procedure levels, are re-
viewed on a de novo standard. Because these levels of scientific in-
quiry do not involve the special circumstances of individual cases,
appellate courts are able to evaluate the research at least as well as
lower courts. In fact, given the sometimes complex nature of scientific
evidence, appellate courts' greater opportunity to consider these mat-
ters should give them a better vantage point from which to evaluate
the science. The third and most concrete level is case specific and
should be left to the broad discretion of the trial court.
50. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 523-24. In applying
Rule 804(b)(2), the court must also find that the declarant is unavailable under 804(a). Id.
51. This analysis of the levels of science is explored in greater depth in David L.
Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past,
Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1799, 1825-34 (1994).
52. William A. Thomas, Some Observations by a Scientist, 115 F.R.D. 142, 144 (1986).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Although de novo appellate review of the scientific theory and
the technique or procedure is probably mandated solely on the basis
of the structure of scientific inquiry,55 inclusion of a necessity principle
to the rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony is entirely
consistent with, and indeed makes more emphatic, this mode of appel-
late review. The basic insight underlying the necessity principle is that
when calculating whether scientific findings should be used, courts
should take into account the likelihood that the science is wrong given
the context in which it is to be introduced. This calculation blends a
sophisticated understanding of the science with a broad appreciation
for the policy choices that must be made in particular contexts.
Across the entire scientific spectrum, decisions concerning the ad-
missibility of particular applications of science present complex policy
judgments. Use of polygraph tests in criminal trials, for example, im-
plicate a defendant's right to a fair trial. Rape trauma syndrome also
raises fair trial concerns when used by prosecutors and raises concerns
over impeaching the character of rape complainants when used by the
defense. Scientific evidence in mass toxic tort cases, such as asbestos
and lead, raise concerns about the most efficient administration of the
civil justice system. The list is virtually without end.
Appellate courts are uniquely situated to understand more than
just the science underlying expert testimony; their vantage point al-
lows them to fully comprehend the broad policy implications associ-
ated with admissibility determinations. Consider the example of
DNA profiling, one of the most scientifically complex and legally im-
portant instances of expert testimony confronting the courts today. A
principal controversy surrounding DNA concerns the presence of sub-
groups within a general population structure.56 The effect that sub-
groups have on the statistical assumptions that go into promulgating
probability estimates for DNA "matches" remains controversial. It is
clear that the existence of subpopulations affect these estimates, but
how much they do,57 and what is to be done about them is less clear.
The general topic of "correcting" possible subpopulation error is too
55. See Faigman et al., supra note 51, at 1820-22 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991) and advocating the de novo standard of
review of scientific information to avoid inconsistent treatment of similarly situated
claims).
56. See David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the
Courts, 7 HARV. J. L. & TEcH. 101, 127-28 (1993).
57. Id. at 128 ("At present, it is doubtful that population structure makes much of a
difference.").
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expansive to discuss fully here.5 8 However, one aspect of this issue
nicely illustrates the dynamic between trial and appellate courts.
What approach should courts require experts to employ when de-
termining the reference population to use in evaluating the likelihood
of a match? If the defendant is Native American, for example, is the
relevant subgroup all Native Americans or the specific sub-subgroup
of Native Americans to which the defendant belongs? Some courts
have been persuaded that the statistical estimation must be subgroup
sensitive. But the logic of this conclusion is not obvious. Professor
David Kaye provides a straightforward statement of the correct prin-
ciple: "The relevant population consists of all people who might have
been the source of the evidence sample." 59 As Professor Kaye ob-
serves, "In most cases, this will not be people with a defendant's an-
cestry, but people of many ethnic groups."60 But this will not always
be the case. As Professor Kaye notes, "Cases do arise where the pop-
ulation of interest is, arguably, a genetically distinct subpopulation,
and where little or no data specific to that subpopulation have been
collected. ' 61 In effect, the standard remains the same in all DNA
58. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see id. at 127-51.
59. Id. at 137-38. As an example of court confusion on this matter, Professor Kaye
discusses People v. Mohit, in which "the court was concerned that the race and ethnicity of
the dentist accused of raping his patient was not represented in the FBI's database." The
Mohit court observed as follows:
The issue of inbreeding is of particular importance in this case. The defendant,
Dr. Mohit, was born in the Iranian town of Shushtar. His ancestors over at least
the past five generations were of Persian descent, all from the same town or a
town close by. They are all of the Shiite Muslim religion. Dr. Mohit claimed that
for religious reasons, and as a matter of tradition, inbreeding was very common in
his family. He indicated that his maternal grandmother was the daughter of his
father's great-grandparents. Marriage among first cousins was common in his
town.
Kaye, supra note 56, at 138 (quoting People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1992)).
Professor Kaye criticizes the Mohit court's analysis:
The issue, however, is not the frequency of matching DNA patterns for inbred
families of Shiite muslims from Shushtar, Iran, but their frequency in the vicinity
of Westchester County, New York, or, more precisely, their frequency among
people other than Dr. Mohit who might have left their semen on the patient.
Unless this group consists largely of Dr. Mohit's relatives, there is no need to
estimate the frequency among people of his racial and ethnic background. The
frequency among broadly defined racial and ethnic groups is the apposite figure.
Kaye, supra, note 56, at 138-39.
60. Id. at 138.
61. Id. at 139. Professor Kaye provides the example of United States v. Two Bulls,
918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated for reh'g en banc but appeal dismissed due to death of
defendant, 925 F.2d 1127 (1991):
Accused of raping a girl on the Pine Ridge Indian reservation in South Dakota,
Matthew 'TWo Bulls moved to suppress testimony of a match between DNA ex-
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cases-the reference population refers to the group from which the
perpetrator must have come-but in some cases this group will be suf-
ficiently homogeneous that it constitutes a narrow subgroup that must
be used to calculate the probability of a "DNA match."
Courts must determine first, as a general matter, the principle for
identifying the appropriate reference population and second, in the
individual case, the population that should be considered in generat-
ing the likelihood of a match under the applicable standard. These
two issues illustrate the respective strengths of trial and appellate
courts. The appellate court possesses the advantage of a bird's-eye
view by which to craft a standard applicable to a wide array of cases,
whereas the trial court has the benefit of a close-up view by which to
apply that standard to the peculiar circumstances of the case. An ap-
pellate court reviewing a trial court's rulings on these matters should
bring a de novo standard to the issue of the appropriate standard, but
should give deference when reviewing the application of the correct
standard to the individual case. Similar dichotomies can be found in
virtually every legal context in which scientific evidence is used.
(2) Ignorance of Science: The Peril of the Necessity Principle
This Essay began by discussing the scope of the challenge
presented by Daubert. On the one hand, judges do not have the incli-
nation or time to become so expert in science that they could contrib-
ute meaningfully to scientific debates; judges do not sit to resolve
debates among scientists. On the other hand, judges must develop
sufficient mastery of science to exert control over the admission of
scientific evidence; judges do sit to protect the integrity and fairness of
the trial process. Attaining a sophisticated and critical knowledge of
the methods of science will not be easy and will require substantial
investment of energy and resources. Over the next ten years,
Daubert's success will be measured largely on the ability of lawyers
and judges to learn the elements of science. Over this time, as was
true in the past, there will be great temptation to slough off responsi-
tracted from semen on her underwear and his DNA. The FBI estimated the fre-
quency of the matching pattern in "a Native American population base."
However, the appropriate reference population is not all Native Americans, but
only the Oglala Sioux. If the FBI's "Native American" database is an amalgam of
distinct subpopulations while the suspect population is dominated by one sub-
population, the frequency of matches in the FBI's database might be beside the
point.
Kaye, supra, note 56, at 139 (footnotes omitted).
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bility for evaluating science, either to the multitude of witnesses-with-
degrees who claim status in the scientific community or to jurors.
The necessity principle contains the danger of contributing to this
practice. Because it permits the evaluation of science within a
broader legal context, there might appear to be less certainty and con-
trol of scientific evidence. In one respect, this is true. Employed by
the scientifically illiterate, the necessity principle poses the danger of
opening the courthouse door to a variety of sorcery. As judges and
lawyers begin to more fully appreciate the subtleties of science, legal
decisions will begin to be more subtle themselves. The simple black
and white categories of good and bad science will evolve into a spec-
trum containing many shades of gray. In order to appreciate and op-
erate this system, judges will need to be able to distinguish between
these shades of gray. The peril lies with those judges who, for conven-
ience sake, see gray in black or white.
The necessity principle might contribute to judicial myopia by
permitting judges to relax demands for scientific validity on the
ground of jurisprudential need. Such need might continue indefinitely
with uncritical judges failing to demand that scientists fully test their
theories. In this way, necessity becomes an avenue by which bad sci-
ence continues to be employed because it is all that is available to
answer the scientific questions the law asks. But this distorts the ne-
cessity principle, which is based on the central premise that judges
understand the culture of science. And the core tenet of this culture is
rigorous testing of hypotheses.
Although the necessity principle contains within it the very seed
that might destroy Daubert, the promise it offers for a mature science
and law relationship is worth the risk. Indeed, without some version
of the necessity principle, Daubert might not be worth saving. With-
out the necessity principle, courts will continue to interpret scientific
research in a vacuum that fails to account for the demands of the legal
context. Only by fully appreciating the nature of the legal issues
presented together with the strengths and limitations of the pertinent
scientific evidence can law and science be integrated into a seamless
harmony.
Conclusion
As judges begin the task of reviewing scientific evidence under
the validity standard articulated in Daubert, many questions arise con-
cerning its practical application. Foremost, perhaps, judges might be
concerned with how wide and deep their knowledge of science must
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be in order to implement Daubert. In addition, because Daubert's va-
lidity standard rests squarely on the traditional evidentiary principle
of trustworthiness, it remains unclear how other traditional principles,
such as necessity, interact with Daubert. In large measure, these two
issues are closely tied, for they both concern, in general, jfudges' facil-
ity with scientific concepts and, more particularly, their ability to inte-
grate those concepts into the law.
This Essay proceeds on the assumption that Daubert requires
judges to become sophisticated consumers of science. However, as
consumers, judges need not themselves be scientists. The scientific
sea is enormously wide and deep, and judges cannot be expected to be
steeped in the detail of all of the science that comes before them. At
the same time, although judges need not be expert enough to write
scientific articles, they should be proficient enough to read them.
Such proficiency would entail judges having a basic knowledge of sta-
tistics and research methodology.
A substantial level of sophistication in the scientific method will
be necessary if judges are ever going to integrate science successfully
into their legal decisions. Daubert rests on the notion of scientific va-
lidity. But science does not come conveniently prepackaged into valid
and invalid containers. Scientific findings inevitably contain the possi-
bility of error, either as a statistical matter or because of the limita-
tions of the research methods used. When making admissibility
determinations, judges must consider the possibility of error in light of
the jurisprudential necessity for the evidence. This Essay outlines a
perspective whereby a judge's determination regarding admissibility
would be a product of both scientific validity and jurisprudential need.
This necessity component would be a function of the legal context to-
gether with the judge's evaluation of the scientific field's testing of the
matter. The necessity principle fully weds the state of the art of the
science to the legal context in which that science is relevant.
As judges begin to plunge into the scientific sea in an effort to
learn enough to stay afloat, they will find that it is a rough and some-
times inhospitable environment. But with practice and patience they
should find that, despite the coldness of the waters, science contains a
world of immeasurable value to the law. All that remains to discover
this world is for judges to hold their noses, open their eyes, and jump.
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